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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
BENNETT MOTOR COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MABK L. LYON, THE T·RAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, a
corporation,
Defendants,
and
UNITED STATES FIDELIT·Y AND
GUARANTY COl\tiPANY,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.

9680

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIE.F
FROM THE DrsTRICT CouRT OF SALT LAKE CouNTY,
UTAH, Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge

APPEAL

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action to recover losses resulting from the destruction of a Ford truck which had been
sold by plaintiff under a Conditional Sale Contract to the
defendant l\fark L. Lyon.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. Defendant Lyon
suffered a default judgment and has not appealed. Plaintiff made a settlement in mid-trial with defendant the
Travelers Insurance Company and dismissed the action
against it. Plaintiff now appeals from a judgment for
defendant-respondent, l'nited States Fidelity and Guaranty Company, hereinafter called "U.S.F. & G."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
On or about August 15, 1958, defendant M.ark L.
Lyon purchased a 1957 Ford Truck from plaintiff under
a conditional Sales Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1;
R. 54). Thereafter, and prior to December, 1959, Lyon
obtained insurance coverage on the truck with two different insurance companies which are not parties to this
action (R. 55, 108-109). Such coverage was cancelled in
each instance for non-payment of premium, and this
fact was known to plaintiff (R. 109, 112).
On or about December 16, 1959, defendant Lyon
obtained from defendant U.S.F. & G. a policy of insurance, No. C1569348, insuring against ''direct and accidental loss of or damage to" the truck (Exhibit No. 2;
R. 54) and on January 8, 1960, a loss payable clause,
showing plaintiff as _lien_ holder, was issued, without
premium charge, .as an endorsement to the l~.S.F. & G.
policy (Exhibit No.3; Finding No.3, R. 55).
On December -31, 1960, because of Lyon's failure to
pay the premium, Heber J. Grant Co., the agent which
wrote the policy for U.SJT. & G., sent a suspension noticeto Lyon (Exhibit No. 13), and it was received by hin1
(R. 127). Thereafter Lyon paid a portion of the premiu1n
but the amount "~as insufficient to maintain the policy
in force and Lyon- was so informed in telephone converSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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•)

:-;ations with representatives of Heber .J. Grant Co. (R.
l:H); Finding R. 55).
On April 7, 1960, the Clerk in charge of policy
cancellation at Heber J. Grant Co. prepared a Notice
of Cancellation of the U.S.F. & G. policy and placed
such notice and a duplicate thereof in separate envelopes
addn':-;~pd to Lyon and to plaintiff respectively, informing them that the policy would be formally cancelled
after ten days had elapsed. Necessary postage was
affixed to the envelopes together with a form of Inailing
certificate used by the U.~. Post Office Department, of
which Exhibit No. 17 is an illustration. These envelopes
after being stamped and sealed were handed to the mail
clerk of Heber J. Grant Co., together with the mailing
certificates. The established routine of the cancellation
(·lerl\: required that before an insurance policy could
later be cancelled, the cancellation clerk must determine
that the envelope with the n1ailing certificate attached
had been received for mailing at the Post Office, and that
the mailing certificate had been receipted .and returned
hy the post office official, and only when the certificate
had been so processed by the Post Office and returned
eould the policy be formally caneelled (R. 199, 201).
The lT.::--;.F. & G. policy was formally eancelled by the
cancellation clerl{ April :23, 1960, as a part of sueh established routine (R. 189-202: Finding No. 5, R. 55).
In the stunmer of 1960, Lyon went to work with the
truck on a construetion project in Arizona. He obtained
insurance coverage for his truck under the fleet policy
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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maintained by the general contractor on the project.
Upon his return to Utah in August, 1960, Lyon applied
for, and obtained, insur.ance coverage on the truck with
the defendant The T'ravelers Insurance Co., which issued
its policy September 15, 1960 (Finding No. 7, R. 56;
R. 130-131). This policy was issued in the name of Lyon
but the loss payable clause attached to the policy mistakenly showed First Security B.ank of Utah as lienholder, even though said bank had no interest in the truck
or transactions concerning it (R. 132, 137, 139). Upon
receipt of the policy, Lyon noticed this and other errors,
took the policy to the Salt Lake City Office of Travelers
and reported the mistakes. He was .assured by Travelers
that the mistakes would be corrected. The mistakes,
however, were not corrected and at the time of the loss
hereinafter referred to, the Travelers' policy was in full
effect ( R. 132-39).
On October 21, 1960, in Uintah County, Utah, Lyon
intentionally set fire to the truck, causing its total destruction. On that date, ·and before destruction, the
reasonable value of the truck was $6,500.00 (Finding
No.8, R. 56).
Lyon reported the loss to Travelers as an accidental
loss but later admitted that he had intentionally destroyed the truck. He did not report the loss to lT.S. F. & G.
(R·. 186).
At the trial of this case on December 19 1961 before
' defendant
'
the close of plaintiff's evidence, plaintiff and
Travelers informed the court that negotiations between
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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those parties had resulted in a stipulation that plaintiff
would dismiss its action as to Travelers in consideration
of the pay1nent that Travelers agreed to make, and plaintiff further stipulated that by reason of said payment,
any judgment obtained against defendant U.S.F. & G.
would be considered reduced by one-half and as to
defendant Lyon, plaintiff agreed to give Lyon full credit
for the full amount of any judgment which might be
obtained against U.S.F. & G. (R. 173-75). As a result
of the stipulation between plaintiff and rrravelers, the
court on January 5, 1962, entered its formal order, dismissing with prejudice the .action as to Travelers (R. 33).
Following the stipulation between plaintiff and Travelers, the trial proceeded as against the re1naining defendants.
The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of U.S.F.
& G..and against plaintiff, no cause of action. On Feb-

ruary ~' 1962, the court signed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Judgment which had been prepared by counsel for plaintiff (R. 34-36, 40). On February 8, 1962, plaintiff moved for a new trial on the
ground that '·Under the Findings of F.act made by the
Court, plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law, and under
a proper interpretation of the written instruments, to a
judgment in its favor.'' (R. -±2).
Also, on February 8, 1962, defendant U.S.F. & G.
servffi its

~[otion

to Amend Findings of F.act, Conclu-

sions of Law and Judgment and submitted to the court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with said motion its proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 43-48).
On March 5, 1962, the court heard argument on the
above motions of the parties ,and on March 15, 1962,
advised respective counsel by letter that plaintiff's
motion for new trial w,a.s denied, that the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment theretofore
filed were withdrawn and that defendant -u.S.F. & G.'s
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment was granted (R. 50-51). The Court requested counsel for defendant U.S.F. & G. to prepare
the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and J udgment along the lines of the instruments it had proposed
to the court, with the exception that the reasonable value
of the truck at the time of loss was found to be $6500.00
and the court made no finding as to reformation of the
policy of insurance issued by Travelers. On :March 29,
1962, the court signed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Judgment as prepared by counsel for defendant U.S.F. & G. pursuant to the court's instructions of
March 15, 1962 (R. 53-57). The court concluded that
the destruction of the truc;k was not "direct and accidental" within the meaning of those terms in the U.S.F.
& G. policy, that the U.S.F. & G. policy was cancelled as
to plaintiff's interest and not in effect at the time of the
loss, ,and that plaintiff did not suffer damages as a result
of any act or omission of defendant U.S.F. & G. From
the judgment in favor of defendant U.S.F. & G., plaintiff
has appealed to this Court.
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STAT ~~~u~~NT PRI~LII\IIN ARY TO ARGUMENT
As shown by the pretrial order (R. 28), plaintiff
urged two theories of .action for recovery against U.S.F.
& G. in the trial court.
It was first contended U.S.F. & G. was liable for
"negligent failure . . . to give notice of cancellation,"
which negligence, it was claimed, prevented plaintiff
from securing cover.age against the loss.
·Secondly, it was claimed the effort to effect cancellation of the policy was "nugatory" because plaintiff
was not given notice of eanceHation.
The first of these theories is not argued in plaintiff's
brief .and has apparently been abandoned in view of the
fact that plaintiff's own evidenee showed conclusively
that two separate and distinct policies of insurance, with
other companies, had been obtained after the cancellation
date of the U.S.F. & G. policy.
The second theory-that the policy was not effectively eancelled as to plaintiff-is argued vigorously in
its brief with copious citation of authorities. The general
principles of law announced by the cited cases are not
in dispute here, and defendant will not argue the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding
that plaintiff ''",.,as ''notified" of cancellation.
Argmnent on this point is unnecessary, since the
issues believed to be determinative of the case, as hereinafter set forth, show that the Court need not reach
the question of notification of cancellation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGU~1ENT

POINT I. THE LOSS WAS NOT "DIRECT AND ACCIDENTAL" AND SO WAS NOT WITHIN THE COVERAGE
OF THE POLICY ISSUED BY DEFENDANT U.S. F. & G.

Under the policy of insurance issued to Mark L.
Lyon on December 19, 1959 (Exhibit 2), U.S.F. & G.
agreed under "Coverage F" of the "Insuring Agreementf'," to

"pay for direct and accidental loss of or
damage to the automobile, hereinafter called loss,
caused (a) by fire ... " (Emphasis added.)
This clause defines in elear and simple terms, as to
a particular hazard, the extent of the coverage afforded
and the measure of the liability assumed by U.S.F. & G.
under the policy. And, of course, only losses which come
within the coverage definition would be compensable
under the' policy. 29-A Aln. Jur. 289 (Ins. § 1135); 45
C.J.S. 616 (Ins. ·§ 674); U.S. Trust ~· Guaranty Co. vs.
West Texas State Bank (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), 272
S.W.2d 627. Thus only if the intentional destruction of
the truck by Lyon in this case constitutes such a ''direct
and accidental'' loss can it support a recovery under the
policy.
In this connection, it may be noted that it is uniformly he,ld that an intentional and v~ilful destruction
of the insured property by, or .at the instigation of, the
insured does not constitute a "direct and accidental"
loss within the meaning of the above clause, and hence
is outside the cover'age· provided by such clause. Leu: is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Audttrbon Ins. Co. (La. 1953), 62 So.2d 850; Fedele
I'S. National Li!Jerty Ins. Co. (V.a. 1945 ), 35 S.E.2d 766;
Federal Ins. Co. vs. lVong (D.S.D. Calif. 1956), 137 F.S.
:2:~2; Bellman, et al., vs. Home Ins. Co., et al., (Wise.
1!>:2:2), 189 N.W. 1028; Jones vs. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins.
Co. (TPx ------------), 250 S.W.2d 281; H.(J)rgrove vs. American Ceutewzial Ins. Co., (lOth Cir. 19'42), 125 F.2d 225,
:2:2~; Odent Ins. Co. vs. Cox (Ark. 1951), 238 S.W.2d 757;
f{lemens vs. Badger Mutual Ins. Co. (VVisc. 1960), 99
N.W. 2d 865; Federal Ins. Co·., et al., vs Tam~ami TraiJl
Tours, Inc., et al. (5th Cir. 1941), 117 F.2d 794, 796;
Chaachou vs. American Central Ins. Co. (5th Cir., 1957),
241 F.2d 889; 29-A Am. Jur. 427 (Ins.·§ 1304); U.C.A.,
1953 § 76-6-4.
'I'S.

In its brief plaintiff attempts to circumvent the
effect of the above rule by noting that many authorities
hold that under the type of loss payable or mortgage
clause endorsed on the U.S.F. & G. policy, known as the
Standard or Union clause, two separate and independent
insuring contracts .are effected; one between the insurer
and the mortgagor and the other between the insurer
and the mortgagee, and that the latter contract with the
1nortgagee is not necessarily invalidated by acts of the
mortgagor even though such acts would clearly invalidate
the contract with the mortgagor. From these authorities,
with which this defendant does not take issue, plaintiff
draws the unwarranted and erroneous conclusion that,
as to its interest in the truc:k, the policy provided coverage against its intentional destruction by the defendant
Lyon. Plaintiff erroneously concludes that a mortgagee
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is protected against all losses resulting from acts of the
mortgagor without regard to coverage provisions in the
policy under which the loss is claimed. Obviously, such
a position eannot be sustained.
This defendant readily concedes that the 1oss payable endorsement issued by it on January 8, 1960, is the
Standard or Union clause and that, under the great
weight of authority and .as is seen from its language, it
effects a separate contract with the mortgagee as to the
.. loss or damage, if any, under the policy" (Emphasis
ours.) Further, it is conceded that the separ.ate contract
may not be invalidated by acts or omissions of the mortgagor even though such acts or omissions ·would clearly
invalidate the policy with the mortgagor. This, however,
is not to say that the separate contract ·with the mortgagee rewrites the insurance policy or enlarges it to
include a kind of loss not insured against b~~ the plain
language of the coverage provisions of the pohc~~.
As is stated in the leading case of Tr.avelers In-s. Co.
vs. Springfield Fire & llfan·ne Ins. Co. (8th Cir. 1937).
89 F.2d 757, 761:
''In order to determine what the contract
between the insurer and the n1ortgagee is, reference must necessarily be had to both the 1nortgage
clause and the policy of which it is 1nade a p.art.
To ascertain the property insured, the ha.zard insur·ed_ aga~nst, the amount of the insurance, the
duratwn of the contract, the e.rten.t of the coverage) the terms of the corerage, the date when the
insur.ance takes effect, the conditions under which
it 'dll remain effective. and the mnount of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pn•mimn, re~;ort must be had to the policy. In
other words, the policy fixes the quantity and
quality of the insurance except insofar as it may
he modified hy the mortgage clause, .and the general purpose of that clause is to ma:ke the insuraneP provided for in the policy payable to the
mortgagee as its interests may appe.ar." (Emphasis added.) Ree also, U.C.A., 1953 § 31-19-36(1).
This rule is not in conflict with the -authorities cited
hy plaintiff as can be seen from the quotation, at page 29
of its brief, frmn 5 Appleman, Insurance § 3401 at 560,
to the effect that "the policy terms themselves are not
nullified h~, a standard mortgage clause ... hut rather,
.... a new contract containing those (policy) provisions
i8 made with the mortgagee personally." (Emphasis
added.) Also, it will be noted that Piedmont Fire Ins.
Co. r. Fidelity JJ!ortgage Co. (Ala. 1948) 35 So. 2d 352,
cited by pl-aintiff as support for his contention, states as
follmn;; at page 3fl-l: of the opinion:
"\Ye readily agree with counsel for appellant
that if the loss was not within the cover:age of
policy contract, it cannot be brought within that
coverage hy invoking the principle of waiver or
estoppel. . . . No one, we would assume, would
agree that a policy of insurance which protected
one .against loss by fire, could be extended or
broadened, by application of the principle of
waiver or estoppel, to cover a loss by cyclone. The
effect in sueh a case, would be to create a new
c:-ontraet, without a new consideration.''
Sinee, as noted ahove, an intentional destruction of
the insured property does not constitute a ''direct and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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accidental" loss, it is clear that the loss in this case was
not covered by, and hence is not compensable under the
U.S.F. & G. policy. None of the authorities cited in
p}aintiff's brief will support .a different conclusion. They
involve losses that were clearly covered by and were
clearly within the plain language of the insuring agreement of the policy, and the question was whether the
breach of a policy ''condition" by the mortg.agor would
invalidate the policy as to the mortgagee. Obviously
such is not the situation in the present case where the
question is simply one of "'coverage'' under the policy.

In U.S. Trust 4' Guaranty Co. vs. West Texas State
Bank (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), 272 S."\V. 2d 627, a policy
of insurance naming the bank as loss payee, under a
Standard or Union mortgage clause, was issued to the
owner of an automobile, insuring loss sustained "While
the automobile is within the United States of America,
its Territories or Possessions, Canada or Newfoundland." The automobile was damaged while being driven
in Mexico by the named insured. The mortgagee bank
there contended, as does the plaintiff in this case, at
page 628, as follows:
"Appellee (bank) contends that the purpose
of the endorsement was to protect the mortgagee
bank from the act of the nwrtgagor in taking the
automobile into Mexico. The hank says that said
endorsement n1akes .a new and independent contract between it and the insurer and its validity is
dependent solely on the acts of the mortgagee,
unaffected by any act or neglect of the mortgagor
in violation of the 'conditions' of the policy.. ~ .
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\V"e think said endorsement does not grant additional coverage under the policy to anyone and
that the unan1biguous provision that the policy
eovPrs only aeei<lents which occur 'while the automobile is in th<' United States ... ' excludes coverage of aeridents which occur outside said territoriallimib;." (J~mphasis added.)
rrhe Conrt concluded at

fi~D:

· ·\Y e recognize that the clause making the loss
payable to the mortgagee reg.ardless of any act
or neglect of the mortgagor, permits the mortgagee's recovery despite any violation of a 'condition' by the mortgagor unknown to the mortgagee .
. . . The question here is not relative to such a
matter. The question is whether the accident that
dmnaged the auto wafl eovered by the policy. The
plain, unambiguous language of the policy compels the conclusion that while the auto was without the territory eovered by the policy there was
no eover.age under the policy. This was not a
condition the breaking of ,,~hieh by the mortgagor
was, aecording to the contract, not to affect the
rights of the innoeent mortgagee. The policy simply provided that there was no insurance while
the car was without the territory stated.... The
bank's claim ... was not covered by the policy."

Another rase. ahnost identieal on its facts to the

C.S. Trust

ea~e.

supra, Southwestern Funding Corp. v.

Jlotors l11s. Corp. (Calif. D.C.A. 1962), 22 Cal. Reptr.
7S1. reached the same conclusion that policy "coverage''

was the smne under the payable clause and under the
policy itself and that the mortg.age would not be protected against

los~es

outside that policy roverage.
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In a final attempts to evade the effect of the rules
set forth above, plaintiff points to the provision in the
loss pay.able endorsement ·which specifically excludes
from coverage as to the mortgagee, losses caused by the
"conversion, embezzlement or secretion" of the insured
property by the insured, and concludes that, since arson
of the insured property by the insured is not also listed
arnong those exclusions, it is necessarily covered along
with all other imaginable losses caused by acts of the
insured which are not expressly excluded. To sustain
this contention would indeed be to "extend" the policy
coverage "without a new consideration" in disregard of
the ''plain, unambiguous language" of the policy coverage provisions.
The purpose of adding, to the loss payable endorsement, the clause specifically excepting from coverage
conversion, embezzlement or secretion by the insured
becomes readily apparent upon close examination of the
policy provis~ons, particularly when it is remembered
that the policy and its endorsement .are ''standard forms''
designed so they may be used for numerous and varied
kinds of risks and coverages. The clause ·was simply
added to exclude from coverage these specific ris:ks which
would be otherwise covered, if a premium were paid for
insur:ance, under "coverage G," wherein the company
agrees:
"To pay for loss of or damage to the automobile, hereinafter called loss, caused by theft,
larceny. robbery or pilferage." (Exhibit No. 2)
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It will be noted that the phrase "direct and accidental" does not qualify this coverage provision as it
qualifies the coverage provided under Coverage D (covering losses frmn other than collision or upset), Coverage
E (eovering collision or upset), Coverage F (covering
fire, lightning and transportation), and Coverage H
(providing con1bined additional eoverage). Only the
insurance under Coverage F is involved in this case.
It is obvious that without the loss payable provision,
excluding coverage of those specific acts of the insured,
the company would he responsible, under Coverage G to
.a Inortgagee since there is no "direct and accidental"
limitation on such coverage. The fact that such losses
resulted from wilful acts of the insured, while providing
a valid defense to any claim by the insured, would not
invalidate such coverage as to the mortgagee.

The addition of these specific exclusions to the loss
payable endorsement, however, in no way affects the
n1les stated above, which compel the conclusion that the
loss in this case does not f.all within the coverage provided in the U.S.F. & G. policy. The cause of the loss in
the present case, vi.z, loss through arson by the named
insured, is specifically dealt with and excluded from
coverage by the ''direct and aceidental" limitation of
Cover.age F, as that phrase has been uniformly interpreted in the many cases cited at p. 9 of this brief.
Thus, it would have been a useless and redundant gesture
to put a further such exclusion in the loss payable endorsement applicable to this case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
The above interpretation of the policy and loss payable clause as one whole, unified instrument gives meaning to all clauses and provisions ·without i1nporting into
the policy the unnecessary and unwarranted ambiguity,
uncertainty and contradiction which would necessarily
result from the strained construction urged by the plaintiff. The construction urged by the plaintiff would, of
necessity, create an inconsistency between the provisions
of Coverage F, which exclude coverage, and the provisions of the loss payable clause which, in plaintiff's
view, ,."tould provide coverage. Such .a construction is
contrary .to the clearly indicated meaning of the policy
and loss payable clause provisions as outlined above.
POINT II. PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM A RECOVERY AGAINST THIS DEFENDANT BECAUSE, BY ITS DISMIS'SAL OF THIS ACTION AS TO DEFENDANT TRAVELERS, IT HAS IMP AIRED THIS DEFENDANT'S SUBROGATION RIGHTS.

In the event it were held that plaintiff w.as entitled
to recover under the U.S.F. & G. policy, U.S.F. & G.
would, upon payment to plaintiff of the amount of the
loss, be subrogated to the claim of plaintiff against defendant Travelers. Labonte vs. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. (N.H. 1936), 186 Atl. 6, Papandrou rs. Caledonian Ins. Co. (N.:H. 1940), 13 A.2d 735 ~ Zeiger vs.
Farmers and Laborers Coop. Ins. Ass'n. (~fo. 1948),
215 S.W.2d +:Z(): 6 Applen1an. Insurance. Section 4074 at
p. 565.
In the Labonte case, the plaintiff obtained a policy
of insurance covering real property which contained a
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loss payable clause in favor of two mortgagees. Plaintiff lost the policy of insurance and so obtained .a new
policy from Phoenix Ins. Co. which failed to mention
the mortgage interests. Plaintiff then directed the St.
Paul agent to cancel the first policy, but, through some
error, St. Paul failed to notify the mortgagees.
The property was destroyed by fire .and plaintiff
sued both insurance companies to recover the loss. The
trial court found that the St. Paul policy had been cancelled as to plaintiff, but effective as to the mortgagees.
Accordingly it ordered St. Paul to p.ay all interest of the
mortgagees and Phoenix to pay the interest of plaintiff.
On -appeal, the issue was ''whether the Phoeni..x:
policy was valid; and, if so, whether the total coverage
should be paid solely by the Phoenix Company or be
distributed between the two companies" as ordered by
the court.
The court first noted that the situation between St.
Paul and the mortgagees was the same as though the
mortgagees had obtained the policy themselves .and that
~t. Paul, upon payment of the loss, would be subrogated
to the claims of the mortgagees as a matter of law. The
court's holding is stated thus in 6 Appleman, Insurance
Section ±07 4, at page 565, n. 64:
"'Where mortgagor, who had cancelled fire
policy without consent of mortgagees and had
taken out policy in another company, brought
equitable .action against both insurers to deterTiline which policy was in force, original insurer,
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which was still liable to mortgagees and entitled
thereby to subrogation, -could require seeond insurer, liable for full amount of loss, to pay mortgagee's interest directly to avoid circuity of
.action."
In accepting a settlen1ent from Travelers and voluntarily dismissing this action .as to T'ravelers, plaintiff
thereby relinquished all claims which it could otherwise
have asserted against Travelers in connection with this
particular loss. By so doing, it has deprived this defendant of the subrogation right it would otherwise have
had to recover from Travelers the amount ·of any payment made by it to plaintiff. This impainnent of this
defendant's rights is in violation of the loss payable provision which states :
"Whenever the Company shall pay the lienholder any sums for loss or damage under the
policy and shall claim that, as to the Lessee, 1\iortgagor or Owner, no liability therefor existed, the
company shall, to the extent of such payment, be
thereupon legally subrogated to ·all the rights of
the party to whom such payment shall be
made...''
It is well established than an insured is barred fron1
recovering against its insurer where it has destroyed the
insurer's subrogation rights against other parties. 6
Appleman, Insurance, Section 4093 at p. 587, and Section
4074 at page 565 n. 60; Flame Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Young
(T·ex. 1936), 97 S.W. 2d 360.
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CONCLUSION
It is clear that arson of the insured property by the
namP<l insured did not bring about a "direct and accidental" loss as that phrase has been repeatedly interpn'ted by the courts. No case which would contradict
that rule has been brought to our attention. And, the
validity of this proposition cannot be confined to the
contract with the mortgagor, as plaintiff urges, for the
reason that the terms and conditions of the contract with
the mortgagee must be determined by reference to the
poliey of which the loss payable endorsement is a part.
Clearly, the contract with the mortgagee provides the
same "direct and accidental" limitation as is provided
in the poliey itself. Thus, the contract with the mortgagee does not provide unlimited protection against all
acts of the mortgagor, as claimed by plaintiff, but only
against those risks and hazards which come within the
coverage provided for in the policy itself. The loss pay.able clause does not enlarge or stretch the policy nor do
ri~k~, which are otherwise uninsurable, suddenly become
covered without premium charge or consent of the insurer. None of the cases and authorities cited by plaintiff contradict these rules of law.
The fact that the loss payable endorsement specifically excludes conversion, embezzlement and secretion by
the named insured without also mentioning arson does
not affect the result indicated above. These specific exclusions w·ere added to the loss payable clause to limit
the company's liability as to risks which otherwise would
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clearly fall within the coverage provided in Coverage G,
since that clause is not qualified by any ''direct and
accidental'' limitati<on.
Even if it were held that plaintiff could recover
under the U.S.F. & G. policy, plaintiff has forfeited its
right to such recovery by the fact that it has destroyed
this defendant's subrogation rights against the defendant Travelers. Both the right of the insurer to be
subrogated to the claims of the mortgagee against third
parties, and the effect of an impairment of that right
by the mortgagee, are supported by the authorities which
have considered this question.
Plaintiff on appeal has the burden of showing that
the trial court erred and that, except for such error, .a
different result would have been reached.
Plaintiff has failed to sustain this burden. Instead,
the record and the law clearly show plaintiff is not entitled to recover against defendant. The trial court so
found and its judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN H. SNO"\V and
SKEEN, WORSLEY, SNO"\V &
CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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